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Introduction
 It has never been more apparent that people are fundamentally fascinated by politicians. 
24-hour television channels dedicated solely  to politics make up  only the most recent addition to 
newspapers, radio stations, and nonstop internet coverage; yet they have spawned numerous 
duplicates and massively  influential demagogues. When Republicans failed to retake the 
Presidency  in 2012, the story saturating media outlets had almost nothing to do with issues, and 
everything to do with the deterioration of the Republican political strategy. Americans eagerly 
consume the personal histories and agendas of politicians, and political commentary focuses just 
as much on the political calculations behind the actions of our leaders as it does on the actions 
themselves. There are core questions that underlie this fascination. Why do our politicians act the 
way they do? Is there a particular way they should act? In short, what do we deserve, and are we 
being cheated of it by our elected leaders? 
 The question of how should the politician act has persisted independent of regime, place, 
or time. It is the one that generates the most controversy, perhaps because it  is so vitally 
important to politics as a whole. It matters not just to politicians, but also to the citizenry they 
represent. Max Weber’s “Politics as a Vocation” seeks to answer this very question, however 
interpretations of what Weber regards as ideal are mixed. In this essay I look to answer two 
questions. First, what exactly  is Weber’s theory of the ideal politician? Second, is Weber’s theory 
a good one, and is it a sufficient guide for political action? In what follows I will lay  out what I 
believe to be Weber’s theory of the ideal politician. Then, I will test this theory against what  I 
think is a significant critique. Ultimately, it will become apparent that while Weber’s theory  is 
compelling, it is in some ways incomplete.
3
Part 1 - Weber’s Politics as a Vocation
 In order to engage with Weber’s theory at all, it is necessary to first  outline what I 
perceive this theory to be. To do this it  will be relevant to determine what it  is that Weber defines 
as an ethic of conviction and an ethic of responsibility, and to what degree he prescribes each 
ethic to the ideal politician. Interpretation varies in the body of scholarly  work done on both 
these levels. I will begin by drawing the framework from which Weber’s two ethics emerge, and 
settling on an interpretation for each I believe is most supported by the text. I will then address 
the apparent contradiction within Weber’s own work regarding which ethic (or combination of 
ethics) the ideal politician should subscribe to. The contradiction is made explicit  in “Politics as a 
Vocation”, and centers on whether Weber believes the two ethics to be compatible or not. The 
purpose of what follows is to resolve this contradiction and offer a robust account of the true 
nature of Weber’s political theory. To inform this discussion I will reference the arguments put 
forward in two scholarly  articles written by James Underwood and Bradley Starr.1 Ultimately, I 
will argue that Weber’s ideal politician exhibits an ethic of responsibility  instead of a 
combination of the two ethics.
I.  The Framework of Discussion
 Weber begins “Politics as a Vocation” by setting the terms for his discussion. He notes 
that, “What will have to be completely ignored in the present talk will be all questions about the 
kind of politics that should be pursued, that is to say, the specific policies that should be adopted 
in the course of our political activities. For such matters have no connection with the general 
4
1  Underwood and Starr deliver differing interpretations of the ideal politician, each of which relies on a slightly 
varied understanding of the ethics. Broadly, Underwood argues that the Weberian politician balances both ethics, 
while Starr interprets the ideal politician as focused on the ethic of responsibility. I draw from these two accounts 
because they represent the most common arguments advanced in the debate over what Weber takes to be the ideal 
politician with a vocation, and the two sides of the aforementioned contradiction in “Politics as a Vocation.”
question of what politics is as a vocation and what it  can mean” (Weber, 32). Weber’s use of the 
phrase ‘no connection’ may seem to suggest that a vocational politician need not identify with a 
moral framework, nor engage in ethical deliberation concerning such a framework. However, 
this is not the case. One of Weber’s essential qualities for the politician is that he is driven by a 
passionate dedication to a cause.2 The cause is not  one centered on vanity or power-lust,3 but 
rather is a cause in the more traditional sense; that is to say, an actionable goal grounded in some 
ethical interpretation of justice and the ultimate good.4 For the purpose of Weber’s argument, we 
are simply assuming that the politician has already identified with such a cause, not that its 
particular details are irrelevant in the grand scheme of things.
 An important  implication of this is that to engage in politics as a vocation a politician 
need not necessarily come from a place of objective morality, he must only have a passionate 
dedication to a cause he has personally identified with. It  is based on this understanding that 
Weber can separate his discussion of the vocational politician from any  consideration of what 
constitutes an objectively ‘just’ or ‘moral’ cause. In the article “Politics as a Vocation, According 
to Aristotle,” David Morrison best illustrates this point by contrasting Weber’s political theory 
with those of the ancient Greeks and Stoic philosophers. He writes, “Weber the political 
sociologist describes as ‘political’ a life which is committed to the acquisition and exercise of 
political power for some purpose and in the name of some cause, whereas Aristotle the political 
5
2  Passionate dedication to a cause is one of three qualities which Weber claims are “decisively important” for a 
politician. We will revisit these qualities later when we discuss the ideal politician.
3  “[T]he politician is faced daily and hourly with the task of overcoming in himself a very trivial, all too human 
enemy: common or garden vanity, the deadly enemy of all dedication to a cause....” (Weber, 77). 
4 The evidence for this is apparent throughout the text. Weber directly rejects personal advancement as a cause in his 
description of vanity (see footnote 3), and submits various examples of causes one could serve (see footnote 5) 
which embody a dedication to the advancement of something one considers good or right. Ultimate dedication to a 
cause in itself implies a true ethical belief in that cause on the part of the politician. 
philosopher defines the ‘political life’ ideally, as a life devoted to the promotion of the common 
good properly understood” (Morrison, 222). In Weber’s own words, “...this purpose, this service 
on behalf of a cause, cannot be dispensed with if action is to have any internal support. The 
nature of the cause in whose service the politician strives for power and makes use of power is a 
matter of belief” (Weber, 78).5
 In sum, there are two limits Weber has set on the terms for discussion. First, a common or 
shared understanding of what constitutes the good (what Aristotle refers to as the good ‘properly 
understood’), is not a necessary prerequisite for the practice of politics as a vocation.6  Second, 
politicians with a vocation must have a cause, and there is an entirely separate discussion, 
(distinct from what constitutes a just cause), to be had about what constitutes appropriate action 
in the ideal practice of politics once that cause has been established. This is the discussion that 
occupies Weber in “Politics as a Vocation.”7
II. Politics and Politicians 
 Before Weber can discuss what it means to engage in politics as a vocation, he must 
define how anyone can expect to engage with politics at all. That is, he must put forth what 
constitutes the realm of the political. 
6
5 Weber elaborates on the varied types of acceptable causes, “He may serve national or universally human goals, 
social and ethical goals, or goals that are cultural, worldly,  or religious. He may be motivated by a powerful faith in 
‘progress’...or he may cooly reject faith of this kind; he can claim to be acting in the service of an idea, or he may 
wish to reject such claims on principle and choose instead to promote external goals of ordinary life.  But some belief 
or other must always be present” (Weber, 78).
6 As above, the only thing necessary is identification with some cause.
7 “Weber insists that the debate about the “vocation” of politics is ultimately a debate not about whether politics can 
or should be ethical, but rather about what kind of ethical framework is most appropriate to political life” (Starr, 
408).
 First, Weber notes that broadly speaking, the exercise of politics is the exercise of any 
kind of leadership  activity.8  For his purposes however, it  is only necessary to consider, “...the 
leadership, or the exercise of influence on the leadership, of a political organization, in other 
words a state” (Weber, 32). Defined sociologically, the state is the communal body that, “...lays 
claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory” (Weber, 33). 
This definition captures the fact  that the state, (including the administration and legislative 
authority of it), is based on the premise that it  is the only  source of legitimacy, (or right), when it 
comes to the use of physical violence. All its authority is in some way  based on its right to 
enforce said authority, and any individual can only use violence in a capacity previously 
authorized by  the state. Since we know that politics is the exercise of leadership activity, and a 
state is an entity that monopolizes the legitimate use of physical violence as a means of power, it 
follows that to engage in politics within the state means, “...to strive for a share of power or to 
influence the distribution of power, whether between states or between the groups of people 
contained within a state” (Weber, 33). In sum, the relationship inherent to the state is that of a 
group of people exercising leadership, (or power), over another group with the basis of their 
power grounded in the ability to commit violence without violating basic justice.
 The nature of such a state is such that it is composed of many types of people who engage 
in politics. Weber’s final task is therefore to narrow his scope down to the specific type of 
politician who is the focus of the paper.  We will remember that  to engage in politics is to seek to 
influence the distribution of power, “between and within political structures” (Weber, 39). In a 
contemporary  Western Democracy there are many ways of doing this, each associated with 
7
8 “What do we mean by politics? The concept is extremely broad and includes every kind of independent leadership 
activity” (Weber, 32). 
varying degrees of intensity and responsibility. For instance, we all engage in politics, at the very 
least, when we cast our votes in local or national elections. Surely this is an important process, 
but it  is not  subject to the same procedures and responsibilities of, for instance, a United States 
Senator. While the average voter is an “occasional politician,” the senator, who makes politics 
the “primary task of [his] life” (Weber, 39), is a full time politician and the subject of Weber’s 
discussion.
 Finally, given the depth of power of the full-time politician over others, it is appropriate 
to ask what qualities a politician should have to be qualified to lead.9 It is important to note here 
that we have not  yet approached Weber’s discussion of what should guide the action of 
politicians. We only seek to understand the qualities a politician must have to have the ability to 
follow Weber’s advice regarding action. Weber goes out  of his way to identify  three “decisively 
important” qualities.10 
The Three Essential Qualities for the Politician 
 First and as we have already stated, a politician must have passionate dedication to a 
cause. As Weber puts it, “Passion in the sense of a commitment to the matter in hand” (Weber, 
76).11 Second, a politician must have a sense of responsibility to the cause he is passionate about, 
such that the cause, “is made the decisive guiding light of action” (Weber, 77). Taken together, 
these first two qualities ensure that  passion for a cause is translated to commitment for the 
8
9 Weber phrases the question as follows, “What qualities does [a politician] need to do justice to this power...and 
hence to the responsibility it imposes on him?” (Weber, 76).
10 “We can say that three qualities, above all, are of decisive importance for a politician…” (Weber, 76).
11 Weber is careful to distinguish his definition of passion, which is something to be felt at the core of one’s being 
and to be the guiding light of politics, and not the more technocratic idea of commitment to a cause. He argues, “...if 
politics is to be an authentic human activity and not just a frivolous intellectual game, commitment to it must be 
born of passion and be nourished by it.” (Weber, 77).
advancement of that cause in the mind of the politician. Third and finally, a politician must have 
a sense of proportion.  This, in a sense, is the assumption of rationality, or rather the ability to act 
rationally, in the face of irrational impulses. In Weber’s words, “[what is needed] is the ability to 
allow realities to impinge on you while maintaing an inner calm and composure… in short, a 
distance from people and things. For the heart of the problem is how to forge a unity  between hot 
passion and a cool sense of proportion in one and the same person” (Weber, 77). 
 Once again, these qualities are simply are the prerequisites for the politician with a 
vocation. For example, if a politician cannot identify with a cause, than he cannot be expected to 
follow advice on how to best exercise politics with respect to a cause. To identify  with a cause is 
therefore a necessary prerequisite for any  full time politician who Weber seeks to advise. The 
same can be said for the other two qualities, (senses of responsibility and proportion). Weber 
consents that the question he is answering by framing these qualities is an ethical one, “For to 
ask what kind of a human being one must be to have the right to grasp  the spokes of the wheel of 
history is to ask an ethical question.” (Weber, 76). Considering this, although the qualities are 
fairly intuitive and noncontroversial one might be tempted to argue against Weber regarding their 
ethical necessity. However, such an argument would be besides the point. In defining these 
qualities, Weber is certainly  making a normative statement about what gives someone the right to 
hold power, but really the primary function of this section is to identify what constitutes a 
vocational politician because the vocational politician is the intended audience for Weber’s 
ultimate advice.12  
9
12 In his article on Lincoln as a Weberian politician James Underwood emphasizes the role of the three qualities as 
prerequisites for practicing Weber’s ethics, “Weber seems to say that one cannot practice an ethic of responsibility 
without having these three qualities.  The three qualities are passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of 
proportion (Detachment)” (Underwood, 342).
 In sum, we understand Weber to have framed his discussion around what should guide 
the actions of a politician, rather than which causes they  should choose. We further understand 
that the politicians he aims to advise are full-time politicians engaging in politics as understood 
by Weber, and possessing three “decisively important” qualities that endow him with the ability 
to wield his power appropriately. Finally, we can move on to Weber’s account of what should 
shape the actions of a politician with a vocation.  
III. Ethics of Conviction and Responsibility13 
 How should a vocational politician, as understood by Weber, engage in politics? This is 
the fundamental normative question that Weber seeks to answer in “Politics as a Vocation” and 
the topic of this paper. It is of course, an ethical question and according to Weber, there are two 
possible ways by which a politician’s actions may be ethically oriented.14
 The first way is termed by Weber as an ethics of conviction. Broadly defined, an ethics of 
conviction guides the action of the politician in the same way that a moral code such as the ten 
commandments would guide the actions of a Christian.15 As Bradley Starr notes in his article in 
the Journal of Religious Ethics, “The ethic of conviction recognizes a given hierarchy of values 
as the context for moral endeavor” (Starr, 407). A man operating under the ethics of conviction 
concerns himself solely with justly motivated action, and not with the outcome of such action. As 
Weber puts it, “With an ethics of conviction, one feels responsible only for ensuring that the 
10
13 The purpose of this section is to provide a brief account of the structural features of the two ethics. The following 
sections will expand on this framework to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the ethics, but these core 
identifiers are basically consistent regardless of interpretation. 
14  “This is the crucial point. We need to be clear that all ethically oriented action can be guided by two 
fundamentally different irredeemably incompatible maxims…” (Weber, 83).
15  In fact in elucidating the ethics of conviction, Weber makes varied references to Christianity and discusses the 
‘sermon on the mount’ at length. 
flame of pure conviction...should never be extinguished” (Weber, 84). A simple example is the 
ethical belief that it is wrong to kill another human being. Regardless of circumstance, a man 
guided by this conviction will never kill on his own free will. Even if the consequence of not 
killing another were potentially catastrophic, (say, in the case of a terrorist who will certainly kill 
countless others if allowed to live), the man is only  concerned with upholding this moral value 
(or conviction) which he holds paramount.
 The second ethical maxim Weber defines is the ethics of responsibility. Where in the case 
of an ethics of conviction one is bound solely to do the morally correct action, if one guides 
one’s action by  an ethics of responsibility one, “...must answer for the foreseeable consequences 
of [one’s] actions” (Weber, 83). A man guided by an ethics of responsibility acknowledges 
morality  or ‘value obligations,’ but is not prepared to blindly follow an action performed out of 
pure conviction if that  action has evil consequences.16 According to Weber, someone practicing 
an ethic of responsibility, “...feels the responsibility he bears for the consequences of his own 
actions with his entire soul” (Weber, 92). 
 Briefly then, Weber identifies two ethical maxims by which one might guide one’s 
actions. Someone guided by  an ethics of conviction is purely concerned with doing what is just 
as predetermined by a set of values. On the other hand, someone guided by an ethics of 
responsibility recognizes tenets of morality but includes a concern for the consequences of his 
action, assigning himself a certain responsibility for these outcomes.
 It remains for us to understand which ethic, or combination of ethics, Weber sees to be 
ideal for the vocational politician. In “The Structure of Max Weber’s Ethic of Responsibility,” 
11
16 “The ethic of responsibility acknowledges value obligations, but assumes the absence of any given hierarchy of 
values and the inevitability of value conflict as the context for moral endeavor” (Starr, 407)
Bradley Starr argues that the two ethics are fundamentally  incompatible, and further that Weber’s 
ideal politician is guided by the ethic of responsibility. Conversely, in Lincoln: “A Weberian 
Politician Meets the Constitution,” James Underwood adopts the viewpoint that not only  are the 
ethics compatible, but that it is Weber’s argument that  an ideal politician is guided by  some 
combination of the two. In what follows I will begin by outlining the Underwood interpretation 
of Weber’s ideal politician, and present evidence from the text that ultimately  contradicts his 
argument. As we develop a more nuanced understanding of the ethics of conviction and 
responsibility it will become clear that  Starr’s interpretation is more consistent with the text  of 
“Politics as a Vocation”, and that  it is Weber’s view that the ethics are incompatible and a 
politician’s actions should be guided by only the ethics of responsibility.
IV. Underwood’s Theory of the Ethics as Compatible
 Despite his initial characterization of the ethics as “fundamentally different” and 
“irredeemably  incompatible,”17 there is a point in “Politics as a Vocation” where Weber implies 
that there are ways of supplementing one of the ethics with the other. Indeed, the idea that 
morally valuable actions result in good consequences seems rather intuitive in some respects. 
This implication that the ethics can, and should, be exercised in unison is made in the closing 
section of “Politics as a Vocation”. In concluding a description of the type of politician whom he 
would admire Weber notes, “...an ethics of conviction and an ethics of responsibility are not 
absolute antitheses but are mutually complementary, and only when taken together do they 
constitute the authentic human being who is capable of having a ‘vocation for politics’” (Weber, 
92). 
12
17  “This is the crucial point. We need to be clear that all ethically oriented action can be guided by either of two 
fundamentally different, irredeemably incompatible maxims: it can be guided by an ethics of conviction or an ethics 
of responsibility” (Weber, 83). 
 In “Lincoln: A Weberian Politician Meets the Constitution,” it is this statement on which 
James Underwood bases his understanding of Weber’s ethics.18 He outlines two ways in which 
he interprets there to be a possible marriage between an ethics of conviction and an ethics of 
responsibility in the moral worldview of the politician. Then, he uses examples of Abraham 
Lincoln’s political career to provide what he perceives as historical examples of such marriage of 
the ethics. Ultimately, he finds Lincoln to be a prime example of Weber’s ideal politician, a 
politician who he claims would structure his political action around both ethics.
 First, Underwood recognizes the importance of exercising an ethic of responsibility. He 
acknowledges that a politician with a vocation is not free to indulge in a pure ethics of 
conviction, and must be concerned with taking responsibility for his actions.19  However, 
Underwood also interprets the fact that the politician must have a ‘cause’ as proof that ethics of 
responsibility cannot dominate decision-making. He explains, “...the politician may serve any 
one of a variety of worthwhile ends, but he cannot serve merely his own interest. Granting that a 
politician must have a cause would certainly appear to strongly  shape one’s weighing of 
consequences and reinforce Weber’s point that he who has a genuine calling for politics must 
exercise in unison both political ethics” (Underwood, 345). When he remarks that an ethics of 
conviction “shapes” the weighting of consequences, Underwood is essentially  asserting that an 
ethics of conviction strongly informs an ethics of responsibility. In other words, the ethics of 
conviction limits the extent to which the politician concerned with consequences pragmatically 
accumulates power, and maximizes the extent  to which his actions serve his convictions. 
13
18  Underwood refers to the ethics of conviction as the ‘ethics of ultimate ends.’ When quoting Underwood I will 
replace his terminology with ours in order to avoid confusion, but they both refer to the same idea.
19  “But Weber’s ‘politician with a calling’ is not generally free to ignore the consequences of his acting in the 
political world, as could one who follows exclusively an ethic of conviction” (Underwood, 345).
Ultimately, Underwood seems to be saying that there can be no such thing as a meaningful cause 
without the ethics of conviction playing some role in decision making. Otherwise, the cause itself 
is inadequate and the politician purely and pragmatically concerned with power. 
 Second, Underwood argues that  a politician cannot possibly foresee all consequences to 
all his potential actions.20  When consequences of an action are reasonably unforeseeable, or 
when a politician is required to take a leap of faith so to speak, Underwood understands the 
ethics of conviction to play an even stronger role than it does in the weighing of consequences. 
Occasions in which it is impossible to exercise a pure ethic of responsibility because of 
unforeseeable consequences to action are, “... occasions when one has no choice but to take a 
stand regardless of consequences and ‘do the right thing,’ in other words, act  in a way  that is in 
accordance with one’s convictions” (Underwood, 345). This is not necessarily to free the 
politician from responsibility, but rather to provide an alternative course of action which can be 
leaned on more heavily to the extent that information regarding consequences in unavailable or 
unclear.
 These two arguments accomplish two things for Underwood. First, he presents ways in 
which he perceives Weber’s two ethics can work together in theory, despite the aforementioned 
statements to the contrary  in “Politics as a Vocation.”21  Second, in doing so he argues that 
Weber’s later claim in support  of the unison of the ethics is in fact  the true indicator of his 
normative theory of political action.22 
14
20 “...one can never foresee, or control, all consequences” (Underwood, 345). 
21 As when Weber calls the ethics fundamentally different and irredeemably incompatible (see footnote 15).
22 As a reminder, “In this sense an ethics of conviction and an ethics of responsibility are not absolute antitheses but 
are mutually complementary, and only when taken together do they constitute the authentic human being who is 
capable of having a vocation for politics” (Weber, 92). 
 To provide an example of what he sees as Weber’s theory  in action, Underwood 
characterizes Abraham Lincoln as exemplifying this ideal combination of Weber’s ethics of 
conviction and responsibility.23 He states, “In most instances, Lincoln acted in accordance with 
Weber’s ethic of responsibility. Lincoln was acutely sensitive to consequences as is required of 
one who practices such an ethic. However, he successfully demonstrated in exceptional instances 
what Weber says a politician with a calling must also on occasion demonstrate, the ability to 
practice an ethics of [conviction]” (Underwood, 363).24  For example, in July of 1863 Lincoln 
signed an order for the Union army to execute one Confederate prisoner for every black prisoner 
being executed by  the Confederacy. Carrying out such an action would be an example of an ethic 
of responsibility, as the consequences, (preventing the indiscriminate slaughter of black 
prisoners), are desirable enough to outweigh the moral qualms of executing the Union army’s 
own prisoners.25 However, Lincoln instead ended up sticking to his convictions, and could not 
execute the order because his sense of write and wrong gave him an obligation to the ‘innocent’ 
prisoners. Through such examples, Underwood claims that not  only is it possible and ideal for 
the politician to balance the two ethics in a way acceptable to Weber, but that it has in fact 
happened in recent history.
15
23  “Lincoln could say in effect, ‘Here I stand’ and rule out certain acts that in his words would prevent him from 
maintaining ‘some standard of principle fixed within,’ regardless of the likelihood that such acts would have good 
consequences, whether they be contributing to an electoral victory,  saving the lives of black prisoners, or 
maintaining one’s commitment to the specific duties and limitations imposed by the Constitution” (Underwood, 
364).
24  As we will find in the next section,  Underwood is fatally unclear as to what these “exceptional instances” are 
according to Weber, and how they apply to his example of Lincoln.
25 “Such a policy could of course be justified on the basis of its intended consequences, just as could the policy of 
executing deserters from the military, a policy Lincoln sometimes allowed to be carried out even though it caused 
him great personal pain.  To consider such policies provides an excel- lent example of Weber’s point that those who 
choose the role of politician must inevitably confront the question of using what he terms “morally dangerous 
means,” means that would appall those who prefer to practice only an ethic of ultimate ends” (Underwood, 352).
V. Underwood’s Inconsistency With Weber
 Underwood’s thesis of compatible ethics fails to accurately  reflect the spirit of “Politics 
as a Vocation” as a whole. To recap, Underwood’s first point equates the ethic of conviction with 
the effect that the presence of a cause has on the weighing of consequences. In this way, he sees 
the ethic of conviction to be exercised in unison with the ethics of responsibility  whenever a 
politician with a vocation considers consequences to an action.26  Underwood’s second point is 
based entirely on the notion that, “...one can never foresee, or control, all 
consequences” (Underwood, 345), and so therefore at some point one must act regardless of 
consequences, which is to say one must act with a pure ethics of conviction. Finally, his third 
point is that the Civil War Executive Order regarding reciprocal executions is a historical 
example that is consistent with some “exceptional scenario” in which case Weber would allow 
the politician to exercise a pure ethics of conviction. 
 In response to Underwood’s first point, his mistake is blurring the line between the ethic 
of conviction and the nature of a ‘cause’ as put forth by Weber. Underwood takes the politician to 
be exercising the ethic of conviction to some extent whenever his cause informs the weighing of 
possible consequences of an action. However, the presence of a cause that functions as a, 
“...decisive guiding light of action” (Weber, 77), is actually quite separate from an ethics of 
conviction. In fact, in order to practice an ethics of conviction at  all one must already have a 
predetermined cause. It  is the sense of responsibility towards that cause that allows the politician 
16
26  “Granting that a politician must have a cause would certainly appear to strongly shape one’s weighing of 
consequences and reinforce Weber’s point that he who has a genuine calling for politics must exercise in unison both 
political ethics” (Underwood, 345).
to assign meaningful moral weights to the consequences of action.27 Therefore the weighing of 
consequences with respect to a guiding cause is not an example of ethics of conviction and ethics 
of responsibility working in tandem. Rather, it is simply  the exercise of an ethics of 
responsibility, which accounts on its own for the importance of a cause.
 Underwood’s second point assumes that there exists some degree of uncertainty 
regarding consequences, (the limit of which remains unclear), where one is justified in falling 
back entirely  on an ethic of convictions. In other words, where one is acting only on convictions 
and without regard to consequence. However Underwood never fully explains how unsure one 
has to be, and about what percentage of possible consequences of an action. More importantly 
however, nowhere in “Politics as a Vocation” does Weber release the politician from a duty to 
take responsibility for the consequences of their actions. It stands to reason then, that even if a 
politician foresaw only one consequence to his action, and that consequence with a high degree 
of uncertainty, that according to Weber the politician would still have to weigh that consequence 
in his mind before exercising action. That is to say, he would have to practice an ethic of 
responsibility and not an ethic of conviction. Since there is no scenario where a politician can be 
absolutely ignorant of consequences, (after all every action at the very least has some intended 
consequence, no matter how improbable), Weber would not justify  abandoning an ethic of 
responsibility before taking an action no matter how uncertain the outcome.
 Finally, Underwood’s claim that Lincoln’s action regarding reciprocal prisoner executions 
exemplifies some “exceptional scenario” in which Weber would justify falling back on an ethic 
of conviction is baseless. To start, what sort of “exceptional scenario” this is is unclear, since the 
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27 See section II on Politics and Politicians, where Weber’s qualities of passion, a sense of responsibility, and a sense 
of proportion are outlined as fundamental prerequisites for the vocational politician to even begin to consider an 
ethic of conviction or responsibility. 
consequences are fairly straightforward and so do not fall under the umbrella of Underwood’s 
‘unpredictability of consequences’ scenario. So if we take this action as is, we will actually find 
that first  it is not an example of the ethics working in unison, as one ethic is substituted for, and 
directly  contradicts, the other. Second, there is no indication whatsoever that Weber would 
condone the actions of Lincoln in this scenario. He is more likely  to criticize Lincoln’s ability to 
stick to an ethic’s of responsibility, and comment on his lack of fortitude for being unable to 
implement, “morally dubious means” (Weber, 84). 
 So, Underwood’s account of a possible unison between the ethics of conviction and 
responsibility is inconsistent with Weber. 
VI. Weber Views His Ethics As Incompatible
 A close reading of “Politics as a Vocation” leads to the conclusion that to Weber the ethics 
are in fact incompatible, and that the ideal politician practices only an ethic of responsibility. In 
rejecting Underwood’s arguments, we have already touched on some of this textual evidence. In 
what follows I will complete the argument by explaining how Weber’s text leads us 
overwhelmingly to this conclusion.28
 It is a given, as we have already  seen, that the politician with a vocation is dedicated to 
service on behalf of a cause. But the reality of politics is murkier than a superficial interpretation 
of this fact might suggest. Indeed, the result of political activity  often fails to do justice to the 
original motivating cause, and in reality values conflict and obstacles must be overcome in 
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28 As a quick but important reminder, the following section will deal only with proving what is Weber’s view, and 
will not yet dissect his theory with the agenda of finding it valuable by our own standards. Part II of the paper will 
delve more deeply into what exactly makes the ethic of responsibility valuable to us. 
morally dubious ways.29 Nevertheless, if politics is to have any meaning at all, dedication to a 
cause must always have a place in political activity.30 The conflict then, is how can a politician 
structure his actions such that a cause is best served? As Weber puts it, “At this point we find 
ourselves caught up in a conflict of ultimate worldviews, and it falls to us to choose between 
them” (Weber, 79). Here we are told with absolute clarity  that there is no combining worldviews, 
that the individual must choose between them. These ultimate worldviews between which a 
politician must choose are of course the ethics of responsibility and conviction, and for almost 
the entirety of “Politics as a Vocation,” Weber presents them as “...fundamentally different, 
irredeemably incompatible maxims” (Weber, 83). 
 In his article on “The Structure of Max Weber’s Ethic of Responsibility”, Bradley  Starr 
advances this viewpoint. He notes, “Max Weber’s distinction in “Politics as a Vocation” between 
the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility is best understood as a distinction between 
mutually  exclusive ethical worldviews” (Starr, 407). With the exception of the one statement in 
which Weber calls the ethics “complementary” (Weber, 92), the rest of “Politics as a Vocation” 
maintains this understanding of the ethics as mutually exclusive. As if to reemphasize this view, 
which stems from the “irredeemably incompatible maxims” quote on page 83, Weber states, “It 
is not possible to reconcile an ethics of conviction with an ethics of responsibility or to decree 
which end can justify  which means, if indeed you wish to make any concessions to this principle 
at all” (Weber, 86). And yet even this isn’t the end of the evidence we can point to that  shows 
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29 “No ethic in the world can ignore the fact that in many cases the achievement of ‘good ends’ is inseparable from 
the use of morally dubious or at least dangerous means and that we cannot escape the possibility or even probability 
of evil side effects” (Weber, 84). 
30 “It is entirely true and a fundamental fact of all history...that the ultimate product of political activity frequently, 
indeed, as a matter of course, fails utterly to do justice to its original purpose and may even be a travesty of it. 
Nevertheless, this purpose, the service on behalf of a cause,  cannot be dispensed with if action is to have any 
internal support” (Weber, 78).
Weber considers the ethics as incompatible. Once again and in equally unambiguous terms 
Weber proclaims, “[T]here is a profound abyss between acting in accordance with the maxim 
governing an ethics of conviction and acting in tune with an ethics of responsibility” (Weber, 
83). It is therefore abundantly clear that, from the beginning of his argument and then throughout 
the text, Weber defines the ethics as mutually exclusive worldviews and as such believes we 
must choose only one to become the guiding light in all of our actions. 
 In addition, Weber’s clear preference for the ethic of responsibility over the ethic of 
conviction reinforces the view that the politician must choose between them. To begin, Weber 
notes that we cannot dispute the fact that there are scenarios in the real world in which morally 
dubious means must be employed in order to achieve desirable ends.31  The reality of this 
realization brings with it the primary problem with acting solely  in accordance with an ethics of 
conviction; or as Weber puts it, “...the inevitable failure of an ethics of conviction in 
general” (Weber, 85). When a period of crisis comes, for instance the reciprocal execution policy 
instituted (but not followed through) by Lincoln during the Civil War, practicing an ethics of 
conviction actively interferes with achieving a desirable end. In a world where the reality is that 
one must ‘get one’s hands dirty’, the only true effect of an ethics of conviction is to, “...repudiate 
every action that makes use of morally suspect means” (Weber, 85). In short, Weber argues that, 
“The man who embraces an ethics of conviction is unable to tolerate the ethical irrationality of 
the world” (Weber, 85). 
 In conjunction with rejecting the theoretical value of exercising an absolute ethics of 
conviction, Weber also goes so far as to diminish the sincerity  of politicians who claim to do so. 
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31 “No ethic in the world can ignore the fact that in many cases the achievement of “good” ends is inseparable from 
the use of morally dubious or at least dangerous means and that we cannot escape the possibility or even probability 
of evil side effects” (Weber, 84).
“Conviction Politicians” declare, “The responsibility for the consequences cannot be laid at my 
door but must rest with those who employ me and whose stupidity or nastiness I shall do away 
with” (Weber, 92). Weber wonders how much inner gravity underlies these types of statement, 
which reject responsibility and some kind of ethical transcendence among the real consequences 
of their actions. He concludes that there is not very much.32
 In contrast, Weber applauds the strength of character necessary  to embrace an ethic of 
responsibility. For Weber, the ethic of responsibility  is the only viable answer to the ethical 
irrationality  of the world. He notes, “With the ethics of responsibility, on the other hand, a man 
reckons with exactly  those average human failings...he has absolutely no right to assume human-
kind’s goodness and perfection. He does not feel that he is in a position to shift the consequences 
of his actions, where they are foreseeable, onto others. He will say, ‘These consequences are to 
be ascribed to my actions’” (Weber, 84).33  Further in the text, Weber even goes so far as to 
interject a personal, sentimental approval of the individual acting under an ethic of responsibility, 
“By the same token, I find it immeasurably moving when a mature human being - whether young 
or old in actual years is immaterial - who feel the responsibility he bears for the consequences of 
his own actions with his entire soul and who acts in harmony  with an ethics of responsibility 
reaches the point where he says, ‘Here I stand, I can do no other’” (Weber, 92). 
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32  “And if this happens, I shall say openly that I would begin by asking how much inner gravity lies behind this 
ethics of conviction, and I suspect I should come to the conclusion that in nine cases out of ten I was dealing with 
windbags who do not genuinely feel what they are taking on themselves but who are making themselves drunk on 
romantic sensations. Humanly, this is of little interest, and it fails utterly to shake my own convictions” (Weber, 92). 
33  The idea of the Ethic of Responsibility as the answer to the reality of moral dilemmas in everyday life will be 
explored in Part 2 of the paper, when we look towards what is the true value of the ethic of responsibility. 
 All in all, the vast majority  of textual evidence in “Politics as a Vocation” supports the 
conclusion that Weber did not consider his ethics to be compatible, and preferred that the ideal 
politician practice only an ethic of responsibility. 
VII. Resolving Weber’s Contradiction
 It should at this point be fairly obvious that  Weber does not consider the ethics of 
conviction and responsibility  to be compatible, and that he prefers the politician exercise an ethic 
of responsibility. Underwood’s attempts at arguing for compatibility fall flat, and the majority  of 
textual evidence indicates that Weber views the ethics of conviction and responsibility to be 
incompatible. How then, can we account for the statement, “...an ethics of conviction and an 
ethics of responsibility are not absolute antitheses but are mutually  complementary, and only 
when taken together do they constitute the authentic human being who is capable of have a 
vocation for politics” (Weber, 92)? 
 To understand this claim, we must look at the context in which it is being made. This 
statement comes at  the culmination of a paragraph in which Weber describes the man whose 
ethical path of action he finds very moving. As we have already mentioned, this is a man who, 
“…[having acted] in harmony  with an ethics of responsibility reaches a point where he says, 
“Here I stand, I can do no other”” (Weber, 92). This man feels the responsibility  for the potential 
consequences of his actions, and takes that responsibility  squarely on his own shoulders. In other 
words, he acts in accordance with an ethic of responsibility. Even in the paragraph in which it is 
mentioned then, the claim that the two ethics are not absolute antitheses makes no sense, as 
Weber has done nothing to indicate that it should be true. 
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 I would propose that Weber is not, in fact, meaning to suggest that the ethics themselves 
are complementary, but that some quality of the two ethics is a shared and valuable one. When 
Weber writes, “in this sense an ethics of conviction and an ethics of responsibility  are not 
absolute antitheses” (Weber, 92), he is qualifying his statement with the phrase ‘in this sense’ in 
order to avoid this exact contradiction. What does it refer to instead? Weber describes the 
sentiment ‘Here I stand, I can do no other’ as “authentically human” and moving because it 
represents a situation that may befall any person at any point.34 The above statement starting with 
“in this sense” immediately follows that assertion that at some point every human being will be 
put in a position where he will be challenged to take some action such that he will be justified in 
saying “Here I stand, I can do no other.”
 The ‘sense’ in which the two ethics are complementary  then, is that when the human 
being is tested, he must have the emotional capacity  to stand for something, or in other words to 
take action that is rooted in the ultimate dedication to some cause. To come from a place of 
conviction is to stand for some moral ideal with completeness in the face of challenging 
circumstances. To come from a place of responsibility is to comprehend one’s convictions but 
bear an absolute responsibility  for consequences in this same circumstance. Each individual 
takes a stand rooted to some extent in passion for a moral cause. While the ethic of responsibility 
should be the ultimate guide for action, a person must be capable of exercising both ethics, 
capable of devoting his whole moral being to an action. This is the sense in which the ethics can 
be seen as “mutually complementary.”
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34 “This is authentically human and cannot fail to move us. For this is a situation that may befall any of us at some 
point, if we are not inwardly dead” (Weber, 92). 
 Admittedly, this is only one interpretation of what is a frustratingly  ambiguous and highly  
contested section of “Politics as a Vocation.”35  However, the fact that the entirety of the essay  is 
in contradiction with this single statement is a likely indicator that Weber’s true conception of the 
ideal politician regards the ethics themselves as entirely  separate worldviews. So while there may 
be viable interpretations of this section other than the one I put forth, the argument that this 
particular statement proves Weber finds the two ethics to be compatible, and suggests they be 
taken together, is almost certainly not one of them. 
VIII. Wrap Up
 To conclude Part 1, in “Politics as a Vocation” Max Weber sets out to identify the ideal 
ethical worldview for the full time politician with a vocation. This politician already subscribes 
to a cause, has a sense of responsibility, and a sense of proportion. Weber outlines what he 
perceives to be two mutually exclusive worldviews, (the ethics of conviction and responsibility), 
from which this politician might choose to guide his action. When practicing the ethics of 
conviction the individual separates himself from consequences and focuses on taking the most 
morally correct action, while when practicing the ethic of responsibility he assumes the weight of 
the consequences of his actions on his soul.36 Ultimately, Weber’s ideal politician is one who is 
able to absolutely embrace the ethic of responsibility as the guiding light of action.
Part 2 - The Problem With Dirty Hands
24
35  In section 5 of “The Structure of Max Weber’s Ethic of Responsibility,” Bradley Starr submits his own 
interpretation, which links in Weber’s theories of value rationality and instrumental rationality, which I will not go 
into due to its complexity.
36 We will briefly address what it means to do so in the next section. 
 It has been made clear so far what the two ethics are, what the framework is in which 
they  are to be considered, and which Weber prefers. We know that Weber finds it “immeasurably 
moving” when a mature human being accepts responsibility  for the consequences of his action in 
the spirit of an ethic of responsibility. But the question remains, why does Weber find it so 
immeasurably moving? In other words, what makes the ethic of responsibility inherently good, 
or pragmatically useful? 
 In what follows I will outline my interpretation of why the ethic of responsibility  is 
useful, and ultimately the best universal guide to political action. I will then present  two potential 
critiques of the absolute application of the ethic of responsibility, using the internment of 
American citizens of Japanese descent  during World War II as a historical illustration of these 
critiques. Finally, I will examine whether or not the two problems with the ethic of responsibility 
can be resolved, or if they are simply necessary evils and that an ethic of responsibility 
universally applied is the best guide to political action.
I. The Value of the Ethic of Responsibility
 Much of the usefulness of the ethic of responsibility lies in Weber’s claim that it  
addresses the inability of the ethic of conviction to handle certain moral, (especially  in the realm 
of the political), realities. There is an overarching theme in “Politics as a Vocation” that it is 
impossible, especially for the politician, to go through life without  encountering some moral 
dilemma. By moral dilemma we mean a situation in which one’s own personal convictions about 
right and wrong are tested by  some choice in which, for example, one must commit some minor 
evil in order to achieve a greater good, or perhaps to avoid an even greater evil.37 Weber entirely 
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37 “No ethic in the world can ignore the fact that in many cases the achievement of ‘good’ ends is inseparable from 
the use of morally dubious or at least dangerous means and that we cannot escape the possibility or even probability 
of evil side effects” (Weber, 84).
dismisses the idea that only good results comes from good actions and evil results from evil 
ones.38  Indeed, we’ll remember that the very  foundation of politics itself is rooted in the 
legitimate use of force to accomplish some end, which at the very least  automatically  runs up 
against some very basic historical ethical frameworks (particularly religious ones). In his article 
on the ethic of responsibility, Bradley Starr captures the central dilemma here perfectly; “This 
world, then, is permeated with values that obligate human beings, but these values are loosened 
from any mooring in an overarching hierarchy. Hence, moral seriousness is characterized by 
inevitable struggle, and it has a tragic dimension that cannot be eradicated” (Starr, 425). In his 
article “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty  Hands,” Michael Walzer delivers an interpretation 
of Weber’s ethical worldview that is entirely consistent with Starr’s analysis, calling Weber’s 
politician with a vocation a ‘tragic hero’ because he is expected to act despite the irreconcilable 
conflict endemic to many moral calculations.39  In short, these moral dilemmas are an 
unavoidable, and thus tragic, part of the human condition and it falls to us to identify an ethical 
maxim which addresses them most satisfactorily. 40  And to restate for the point of clarity, the 
existence of moral dilemmas are not dependent on an objective framework of morals outside of 
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38 “It follows that as far as a person’s actions are concerned, it is not true that nothing but good comes from good and 
nothing but evil from evil, but rather quite frequently the opposite is the case. Anyone who does not realize this is in 
fact a mere child in political matters” (Weber, 86).
39 “For Weber,  the good man with dirty hands is a hero still,  but he is a tragic hero. In part, his tragedy is that though 
politics is his vocation, he has not been called by God and so cannot be justified by him. Weber’s hero is alone in a 
world that seems to belong to Satan, and his vocation is entirely his own choice. He still wants what Christian 
magistrates have always wanted, both to do good in the world and to save his soul, but now these two ends have 
come in sharp contradiction” (Walzer, 176).
40 Although certain ethical theories, such as Kantian ethics as represented in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals reject the fact that there is such a thing as an ethical dilemma, we are satisfied to be operating under Weber’s 
framework, especially because in real life it certainly is very applicable to politicians,  regardless of whether or not 
Kant is correct in a purely theoretical respect. Further,  politicians are sworn to respect certain duties,  and so ethical 
obligations outside of what Kant perceives as an objective reality must be dealt with in real life. So we will assume, 
and not without substantial theoretical and practical evidence, that moral dilemmas exist, or at the very least could 
possibly exist. The purpose of our argument is to find what are the best ways to deal with them. 
the politician’s own personal moral convictions. To maintain subjective moral convictions is just 
as much to hold oneself prisoner to moral dilemma as if one subscribed to some objective moral 
theory, as value conflict is inevitable either way. The point of this paper and Weber’s work as a 
whole remains to address any moral dilemma that  arises in real life out of the subjective, 
predetermined, and ultimately conflicting convictions of the politician.41 
 When the prospect of irreconcilable moral conflict is taken as inevitable, it is just as 
inevitable that we dismiss the value of the ethics of conviction as a sole guiding light of action. 
As Weber notes, in order to achieve good ends the politician must  at some point get his hands 
dirty, or in Weber’s words engage in “morally dubious” actions. The problem is, the ethic of 
conviction concerns itself solely  with justifying only strictly moral actions.42  If applied 
universally then, the ethics of conviction only has one plausible result, and that is, “...to repudiate 
every  action that  makes use of morally  suspect means” (Weber, 85), or in other words to 
eliminate the possibility  of dirty  hands. This, as Weber says, “...is the inevitable failure of an 
ethics of conviction” (Weber, 85). But we have outlined this particular criticism before in section 
VI of Part 1, so I will not spend any more time restating it.
 What concerns us now, then, is how exactly does the exercise of an ethic of responsibility 
meaningfully address this particular moral dilemma. In section VI of Part 1 we have explained 
that Weber prefers, and is even moved, by  the ethic of responsibility; however apart from that  we 
have yet to mount a robust account of the value of the ethic of responsibility beyond the 
superficially admirable notion that  one takes responsibility for the consequences of one’s actions. 
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41 Inevitable moral conflict was a cornerstone of Weber’s philosophical work. As his wife Marianne Weber puts it in 
her biographical exploration of her husband’s life, “...on its earthly course an idea always and everywhere operates 
in opposition to its original meaning and thereby destroys itself” (Weber 1975, 337).
42  “With an ethics of conviction, one feels ‘responsible’ only for ensuring that the flame of pure conviction, for 
example, the flame of protest against the injustice of the social order, should never be extinguished” (Weber, 84). 
After all according to Weber, “With the ethics of responsibility...a man reckons with exactly 
those average human failings” (Weber, 84). So wherein lies this reckoning?
 The value is certainly not that the ethic of responsibility allows us to calculate what ends 
can justify what means in a way that absolutely  resolves the underlying moral conflict. As Weber 
states, “...no ethic in the world can say when, and to what extent, the ethically good end can 
(justify) the ethically  dangerous means and its side effects” (Weber, 84). Rather, the value of the 
ethic of responsibility seems to be twofold. 
 First, in the case where there exists only a choice between two morally  dubious actions or 
where the politician must get his hands dirty in order to accomplish some good,43  it has the 
pragmatic value of releasing the politician from the potential of moral paralysis and giving him 
recourse to act. It does so by allowing the politician to weigh foundational ethical spheres of 
value, (the ethical worldviews that make up conviction), against pragmatic, real life goals and 
benefits in such a way that he might make the best possible decision considering the 
circumstances. In his book Liberalism and the Origins of European Social Theory, Steven 
Seidman explains, “In a differentiated order, the tensions and conflicts between individual 
spheres and competing powers enhance freedom and movement by protecting the individual 
from absolute control by one institutional sphere or power” (Seidman, 226). 44 Put most simply, 
the politician is freed by the ethic of responsibility  to, (for example in the aforementioned 
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43 These are the primary forms of moral dilemma that we deal with. Essentially they revolve either around avoiding 
some greater evil by exercising lesser evils, or accomplishing some greater good by exercising these evils. 
44 I will not go into the process of weighing these spheres of value against each other, because for the purpose of our 
argument it is not the degree of valuation that we are concerned with necessarily. This degree will vary from person 
to person and depends on interpretation of the details of the matter at hand. What matters is only that this particular 
weighing, which introduces the importance of results instead of just primary actions, is able to exist. As Starr puts it, 
“The areas of institutional conflict between spheres of value and internal institutional rationalities are to be 
regulated, within the ethic of responsibility, just as the basic conflict of subjective social-action rationalities is 
regulated in the ethical sphere: by allowing them to provide limits upon each other” (Starr, 425). 
instance of reciprocal executions during the civil war), assign moral weight to the pragmatic 
value of saving the lives of captured soldiers from the Union Army, and by measuring this 
weight against  the apparent ethical cost of killing innocent Confederate prisoners take the best 
possible action he can, even if that action is contrary to some basic conviction. In this sense, the 
ethic of responsibility is pragmatically very useful. 
 Second and more importantly however, in recognizing means as morally  dubious and 
accepting responsibility for the consequences of those means, the ethic of responsibility solves 
the problem of necessary  morally dubious political action without necessarily  resolving 
absolutely the underlying ethical dilemma. Weber says, “What matters is the trained ability to 
scrutinize the realities of life ruthlessly, to withstand them and to measure up to them 
inwardly” (Weber, 91). In other words the ethical dilemma of action will exist, and the solution, 
if there is one, will be unknown. This state of being, as Weber puts it, is “authentically  human” in 
that no one is exempt from it.45 But the ethic of responsibility  allows us to withstand this reality, 
and deals with the moral ramifications by requiring us to measure up inwardly. We do not ignore 
the moral question at hand, but  because we cannot resolve it we must act with the best intentions 
and accept the weight of the moral burden on our souls. As Bradley Starr puts it, “In such a 
world, values alone are insufficient to guide us, and yet  we cannot become ethical personalities 
without devotion to values. The ethic of responsibility is Weber’s answer to this problem. In his 
view, it is necessary  that human beings make clear to themselves what is required for moral 
seriousness in this context. The undertone is unquestionably tragic” (Starr, 430-1). In fact this is 
really the only reason the we are allowed to weight spheres of value against  each other and thus 
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45 “This is authentically human and cannot fail to move us. For this is a situation that may befall any of us at some 
point, if we are not inwardly dead” (Weber, 92). 
avoid moral paralysis as mentioned in the first  benefit. The “weighting” of spheres of value 
doesn’t strictly solve the problem of morally  dubious action, it is only  in the act of accepting 
responsibility that we have any recourse at all in best  justifying our action. Although we don’t 
resolve the ethical conundrum, we address it  to the best of our ability by “measuring up 
inwardly” to the reality of our actions.
 But what does it really mean to, “...feel the responsibility [one] bears for the 
consequences of his own actions with his entire soul” (Weber, 92)? Is this really  the most we can 
measure up  inwardly  to the problem of dirty hands? Weber is never explicitly  clear as to what it 
means to feel the responsibility  for one’s actions on one’s soul, but perhaps it would be unfair to 
expect him to be. After all, how could one possibly create a checklist of steps that captures the 
process of feeling responsibility, (something incredibly abstract), on one’s soul (something 
incredibly  intangible)? I think it is enough to take the sentiment at  face value. That is, to 
understand that accepting the weight of responsibility “on one’s soul” represents the greatest 
possible degree of emotional attachment to a decision and the consequences of that decision. We 
must tie our very being to these consequences, and take each decision with moral seriousness 
equal to that which we would feel if we were deciding on an action that would effect someone 
who is most dear to us.46 We must have the greatest personal stake possible. If we accomplish 
this, we do indeed measure up inwardly to the reality of our actions with the proper degree of 
moral seriousness.
 In short, this is the real value of applying the ethic of responsibility to political action. 
There will always exist moral dilemmas that require the politician to get his hands dirty. When 
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46 Indeed,  fewer decisions to go to war might be made if politicians committed their sons and daughters to the war 
effort. 
faced with this reality, the most we can do is require that the politician assume the weight of the 
consequences of his actions on his soul. This has the ethical effect of making those actions as 
“morally  serious” (Starr) as possible, and the pragmatic effect of allowing politicians to engage 
in morally dubious action when they deem it necessary to fulfill some duty, or accomplish some 
beneficial end. 
II. Dirty Hands and Executive Order 9066
 Before we outline potential criticisms of exercising an ethic of responsibility as the sole 
guide of political action, it will be helpful to illustrate an example of the ethic of responsibility 
from history. While the ethic of responsibility will be fully exercised as defined by  Weber in the 
following example, (and therefore maintain its intended benefits as outlined in the previous 
section), some key  areas for concern will become clear and our criticisms will arise from these 
areas.
 On December 7th, 1941 Imperial Japan executed a surprise attack on an United States 
Naval base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The next day, the U.S Congress declared war on Japan. In 
the months that followed anti-Japanese sentiment escalated quickly  in the country as a whole but 
especially on the West Coast, where the majority of Japanese-Americans and Japanese 
immigrants had settled. Fear that the Japanese in America were loyal not to the U.S but to their 
homeland manifested on both official and unofficial levels. Shortly  after the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, an official report prepared by a commission established by Congress called the “Roberts 
Report,” suggested that the Japanese consulate in Hawaii had been the center of intelligence 
activity prior to the bombing, and exacerbated rumors of Japanese disloyalty among the public in 
31
addition to influencing the subsequent decisions of War Department officials.47  General John 
DeWitt, head of the Western Defense Command and an influential advisor to the President was 
quoted saying, “[There are] approximately 288,000 enemy aliens which we have to watch and I 
have little confidence that the enemy  aliens are law-abiding or loyal in any sense of the 
word...Particularly  the Japanese. I have no confidence in their loyalty  whatsoever” (Ng, 16). The 
escalation of anti-japanese sentiment and the failure of significant individuals such as Attorney 
General Francis Biddle and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to provide any meaningful resistance 
to the evacuation of Japanese citizens culminated in President Roosevelt issuing Executive Order 
9066 in February of 1942. The Executive Order authorized the Secretary of War to prescribe 
certain areas as military zones and cleared the way for the beginnings of Japanese-American 
internment camps. 
 The Executive Order was worded as follows, “I [President Roosevelt] hereby authorize 
and direct the Secretary of war...whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action 
necessary  or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the 
appropriate Military Commander may  determine, from which any or all persons may be 
excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be 
subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary  of War or the appropriate Military Commander may 
impose in his discretion” (Transcript of Executive Order 9066).48 While the order didn’t mention 
Japanese Americans by name, the effect was very much intended to give the military power to 
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47  “Although there seemed to be no direct implication of Japanese American spying, the Roberts Report helped to 
support rumors of disloyalty among the Japanese in Hawaii and by extension, further doubts about the loyalty of 
mainland Japanese. Thus, it was likely to have influenced War Department officials in their quest to evacuate and 
exclude the Japanese population from the West Coast of the United States” (Ng, 16). 
48 United States Federal Government.  "Transcript of Executive Order 9066:  Resulting in the Relocation of Japanese 
(1942)." Our Documents. http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=74&page=transcript (accessed 
April 21, 2013).
remove Japanese aliens and citizens as they saw fit.49 Roosevelt was informed by  his advisors 
and, having full awareness of the situation, determined it necessary  to sign the order so as to 
ensure what he felt was useful for the future protection of the country  during a time of war. As 
historian Roger Daniels notes in reference to the final evacuation and internment of Japanese 
Americans, “The leader of the nation, was, in the final analysis, responsible. It  was Franklin 
Roosevelt, who in one short telephone call, passed the decision-making power to two men who 
had never been elected to any office, saying only, with the politician’s charm and equivocation: 
‘Be as reasonable as you can’” (Daniels, 72). 
 And so as a direct effect of Executive Order 9066, thousands of American citizens of 
Japanese decent were placed in internment camps. Shortly after the order, Japanese American 
citizens were banned from the western portion of Washington, Oregon, California, and the 
southern half of Arizona, as well as portions of all other states (Ng, 21). After initial ‘voluntary’ 
evacuation proved inefficient, the government began the forceful evacuation of Japanese-
Americans from these military zones and into internment camps of various kinds. In March of 
1942 roughly  70,000 U.S citizens of Japanese descent were evacuated to assembly centers where 
they  would remain for an average of 100 days (Ng, 32). Families were told what  property they 
could bring and what they had to leave, and many families were forced to sell personal property 
or otherwise leave it abandoned. The evacuees were allowed only two suitcases per person, 
barely anything considering the uncertainty  their future held. Evacuees were registered prior to 
entry  of the assembly  center, and allotted 200 square feet per couple and minimal amenities, 
although the reality was that in addition to shortages of supply, “...[assembly centers] were not 
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49  “The effect of the order gave power to the military to remove Japanese aliens and citizens according to their 
needs” (Ng, 18). 
meant to be inhabited by humans” (Ng, 34). Walls of pine wood covered with tar paper provided 
little to no insulation  even in some of the more habitable camps, and other camps were often 
hastily converted horse stables or similar constructions. Protection from the elements was scarce, 
rations few, and space extremely limited as it was not uncommon for large families to share a 
20ft by  20ft room, or even for families of four to live in an 8ft by  20ft room (Ng, 35). In April of 
1943, an elderly resident at an internment camp in Topaz was shot and killed when as he 
approached the outer fences of the camp compound because the guard on duty believed he was 
trying to escape (Ng, 45). 
 These were the morally dubious means of President Roosevelt, with the stated ends of 
protecting the country, “...against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, 
national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities” (Executive Order 9066). The President 
himself could not have known the true extent of counter-espionage the order would provide, and 
so to a great extent the potential consequences of his action were uncertain. So did the process of 
internment actually accomplish any of these goals? Regretfully  for the President, they did not. 
The reality turned out to be that the evacuation of Japanese-Americans in fact  had a minimal, to 
the point of negligible, benefit on counter-espionage during the War, especially considering the 
enormous costs (both financial and ethical) of the process itself.  In 1980, almost forty  years after 
the evacuation of American citizens, Congress established the “Commission on Wartime 
Relocation and Internment of Civilians” to investigate the effect  of Executive Order 9066 and the 
subsequent internment process. In a report entitled “Personal Justice Denied,” the Commission 
denounced the motivation behind the policy of evacuation as well as its effects. Citing 
“tremendous human cost”, the Commission noted the fact that there had not been, “...a single 
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documented act of espionage, sabotage, or fifth column activity [by] an American citizen of 
Japanese ancestry or by a resident  Japanese alien on the West Coast” (Personal Justice Denied, 
Summary). By the time the President made the decision to close down the program in 1944, it 
had become abundantly clear that there had been, “...no rational explanation for maintaining the 
exclusion of loyal ethnic Japanese... [and that] certainly there was no justification arising out of 
military necessity (Personal Justice Denied, Summary). 
 President Roosevelt’s decision to issue Executive Order 9066 with full knowledge of its 
intended use, (as well as his subsequent decision to issue Executive Order 9102 creating the War 
Relocation Authority),50 led directly  to the internment of American Citizens of Japanese descent. 
The result of these actions was the denial of fundamental rights to a select group of American 
citizens based on their ancestry. These citizens were forcibly removed from their homes often at 
great loss of property, set up in internment camps not fit for human inhabitants, and even on at 
least one occasion killed with the intention of constraining them to these camps.
 These were the consequences of the decision made by Roosevelt  to issue the Executive 
Order, and this decision was made in a manner entirely consistent with Weber’s ethic of 
responsibility. Roosevelt was presented with a moral dilemma, one arising out  of conflicting 
spheres of value. On the one hand, he was confronted with his duty to uphold the rights of 
American citizens as outlined by the Constitution of the United States. In the other, he held his 
duty as Commander in Chief to ensure the safety of the United States from foreign attack. 
Ultimately, he made the calculation that the potential benefit  of saving lives by eliminating 
potential Japanese spies from the equation merited the suspension of liberties for this particular 
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50 The organization that administrated the evacuation of the military zone and the distribution of Japanese-American 
citizens among the various types of internment camp. 
group of American citizens. Whether or not Roosevelt  fully  assumed the weight of the 
consequences on his soul cannot be proven, but it would not be unrealistic to assume that he took 
the decision seriously  and accepted his role in the outcome so we will say, for the purpose of 
argument, that he did.
III. Potential Criticisms of the Ethic of Responsibility
 To recap Section I, the ethic of responsibility  “measures up” to the challenge of “getting 
one’s hands dirty” by accepting that this is the state of affairs in which we live, and that the most 
morally meaningful way we can address this is by accepting the full weight of the consequences 
of our actions on our souls, especially when those actions are morally dubious.51 Although this 
seems not to be ideal, in reality it is our best possible recourse. In many ways Weber’s point  is a 
good one. After all, when reality makes ethical dilemmas inevitable what more can we possibly 
do except feel the weight of our actions on our soul to the greatest extent that we can?
 However as we can see from our historical example, when we accept the ethic of 
responsibility as the universal guiding light to all political action, we run into certain serious 
potential problems. In reality, the consequences of one’s actions, especially when one is 
considering engaging in morally  dubious actions, often come with a significant degree of 
uncertainty. Furthermore, when considering a particularly powerful politician such as the 
President of the United States, it is certainly  not  inconceivable that the stakes involved with 
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51  Bradley Starr summarizes this very well, “...moral decision, made in the context of the irreducible conflict of 
values,  itself involves a decision to order values in the given situation, and to reject,  accept, or impose costs. In 
acknowledging this, the ethic of responsibility demands of its adherents that they hold themselves - and allow 
themselves to be held - accountable,  that they acknowledge the ethically creative dimension of their decisions, and 
that they attain moral clarity as to the ultimate meaning of their action by allowing the rationalities of the various 
spheres upon which the impact of action will be felt to speak and be taken into account” (Starr, 426). 
regard to political action are very high.52  By  prescribing an ethic of responsibility to all 
considerations of potential action, we are allowing the politician to make subjective, moral 
calculations about actions whose consequences may  be supremely far-reaching and impactful. 
The calculations are based entirely on his own personal convictions.53  Is it possible that in 
making such a subjective decision fully  under the ethic of responsibility, the politician may incur 
disastrous results, or employ means that are at the very least dangerously, if not unacceptably, 
morally dubious? As we have seen the answer is yes to both.
 The two potential problems with employing an absolute ethic of responsibility as a guide 
for political action can be summarized as follows:
1. It is commendable that  the politician feels the weight of the consequences of his 
actions on his internal soul. However whether these consequences be good, bad, or 
catastrophic, the citizenry as a whole feels them in reality.54
2. Because the ethic of responsibility  allows the politician agency in deciding which 
morally dubious means to use in order to achieve what he perceives as good ends, it 
places no objective limits on the degree of ‘dubiousness’ of the means, nor does it 
ensure the intended consequences are ever realized. 
In extreme circumstances, the consequences of these failures can arguably  be catastrophic. 
Acting under an ethic of responsibility, a politician would be justified in suspending, or even 
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52 In his essay “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands” Michael Walzer notes the problem of moral dilemmas 
are often problems of, "choos[ing] between upholding an important moral principle and avoiding some looming 
disaster" (Walzer, 160).
53 See part 1 Section II for the qualities of the vocational politician. 
54  In other words, is it really enough for the politician (just one man) to be satisfied with accepting responsibility 
when his actions may be physically or emotionally damaging to millions in real life?
eliminating, some fundamental freedom55 in order to achieve a goal which perhaps he feels is 
worthwhile, but either turns out to not be worthwhile due to miscalculation and the uncertainty of 
consequences, or is starkly  contrary to the convictions of society and only worthwhile to him. 
And while he has internally assumed responsibility for these consequences, how much moral 
thrust does this really have when placed upon the real life effect of these consequences on 
thousands, if not millions, of human beings? 
 Executive Order 9066 was a fully  plausible outcome of a politician acting under Weber’s 
ethic of responsibility, and a perfect illustration of its potential shortcomings. First of all, 
although Roosevelt  may have truly  felt the weight of the entirely  negative consequences on his 
soul, this seems insignificant when compared to the fact that tens of thousands of American 
citizens were denied their basic liberties and suffered physical and psychological pain. Here is 
the failure of the ethic of responsibility to address the effect of consequences on the citizenry 
when those effects are entirely negative. As Michael Walzer puts it, “...the crimes of Weber’s 
tragic hero are limited only  by his capacity  for suffering and not...by  our capacity  for 
suffering” (Walzer, 179).
 Secondly, Roosevelt’s intention was to briefly suspend civic liberties in order to achieve 
the benefit of better security. In the first place, he clearly miscalculated because there is little 
proof that internment resulted in a meaningful improvement in security or counter-espionage 
efforts. Further, even if he had not  miscalculated some people might argue that the action of 
suspending a civil liberty upon which a society has been built is too morally dubious, regardless 
of the circumstances. Here is the failure of the ethic of responsibility  to place any  objective limits 
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55  The concept of what could be considered a fundamental freedom will be addressed later, but for now we will 
simply say that whatever it is, it is an accepted cornerstone of the society in which the politician acts. 
on action, allowing the politician to engage in any possible action as long as it  fits his own 
subjective calculation of moral need and regardless of the uncertainty of potential consequences 
being realized.56
 Now that we have outlined the criticisms levied against the universal application of the 
ethic of responsibility as a guiding light of action, let us examine whether or not they justify any 
revision to Weber’s theory, or perhaps the ethic of responsibility is the best we can do. 
IV. Limits of the First Criticism
 In thinking to resolve the first criticism, one might be tempted to say that all that needs be 
administered is the appropriate punishment for the evil caused by the actions of the politician. 
That is, in addition to feeling the ‘weight’ of the consequences on his soul, the politician would 
also feel the punishment of justice in reality and only therein would he answer fully for the 
damage caused by his actions. As Walzer states in “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty 
Hands”, “We [might] simply honor the man who did bad in order to do good, and at the same 
time we would punish him. We would honor him for the good he has done, and we would punish 
him for the bad he has done” (Walzer, 179). However this solution is problematic both in theory 
and in reality. From a theoretical perspective, As Weber explains, as an agent of the state the 
politician is unique in that he exercises the only legitimate form of power. If his use of power is 
legitimate, it is very  difficult under normal circumstances to justifiably punish him for exercising 
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56  Walzer also recognizes this shortcoming, “Since it is concerned only with those crimes that ought to be 
committed, the dilemma of dirty hands seems to exclude questions of degree” (Walzer, 179). 
it.57 From a practical perspective and regardless of the issue of legitimacy, fear of punishment 
could potentially  paralyze any politician looking to take action with even the slightest degree of 
moral ambiguity attached to the action itself. Indeed, if the politician were to take some morally 
dubious (by his own measurement) action in order to achieve a greater good or avoid a greater 
evil, the remedy to the first critique would require him to hold himself accountable and accept 
punishment for the action. From a practical standpoint this would surely cause political action to 
all but crawl to a standstill, as politicians paralyzed by the threat of punishment take no action at 
all in place of any measure of dubious action. 
 This first critique of applying an absolute ethic of responsibility as a guide to political 
action then, is not one that can be made better by some other standard of action. The closest we 
can come to addressing the inequity  between the consequences felt by the politician and those 
exacted on the citizenry is to demand the politician carry the weight of the consequences on his 
soul, which the ethic of the responsibility already does. In short, the ethic of responsibility 
overcomes the first potential criticism we have levied against it because we can go no further in 
imposing consequences on the politician himself without sacrificing the significant ethical and 
pragmatic benefits of the ethic of responsibility as outlined in Section I. 
V. The Second Criticism and a Potential Remedy
 The second criticism, (that no objective limits are placed on the moral dubiousness of 
action nor are there guarantees that intended consequences will be realized), is in part a 
substantial one. In what follows I will elaborate as to the basis of the second criticism, and find 
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57 Especially if it is well within the boundaries of some Constitution or legal system. Michael Walzer recognize the 
reality of this, “In most cases of civil disobedience the laws of the state are broken for moral reasons, and the state 
provides the punishment. In most cases of dirty hands moral rules are broken for reasons of state, and no one 
provides the punishment. There is rarely a Czarist executioner waiting in the wings for politicians with dirty hands, 
even the most deserving among them. Moral rules are not usually enforced against the sort of actor I am considering, 
largely because he acts in an official capacity” (Walzer, 179).
that while we cannot place some limit on the moral dubiousness of action, we can at least prevent 
the politician from engaging in morally dubious means when the consequences of his actions are 
sufficiently unpredictable.  
 First let’s address the concern regarding the limits to the moral dubiousness of actions. In 
theory, and in practice, states are founded upon some fundamental right, or combination of 
rights, of the citizens that make up the state. Examples are abundant. In the United States, the 
Bill of Rights ensures, among other liberties, freedom of speech and of religion. Across the world 
in Japan the guarantee of certain rights is just as present, including the right not  to be forced into 
involuntary servitude.58 These are rights that the state guarantees the people. They are considered 
to be the cornerstones of society, and only once they are secured can further progress be made. If 
one violates these rights, one arguably unravels the core fabric of the society  itself. Theoretical 
accounts of just states are just as reliant on foundational rights. In John Locke’s Treatises of 
Government, he maintains that every individual has a right to their life, liberty, and property. In 
Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan, Hobbes argues that  each man has the right to enter a contract with 
others. In John Rawls’s Theory of Justice, he claims that in a just society all men would have, 
“...equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar 
scheme of liberties for others” (Rawls, 53). The reasoning by which the aforementioned theories 
are formed is varied, and we will not  concern ourselves with which set of liberties is most 
objectively good, as this is outside the scope of our argument.59 What is significant is that in 
these societies where a state has been established, its most fundamental purpose is almost always 
41
58 Unless as part of a sentence for a crime.
59 See Part 1 Section I on the framework of discussion.
to serve to protect a certain pre-determined set of basic liberties. In the United States at the very 
least, this much is abundantly clear even in the tone of political discourse today. 
 These are the obligations of the state to the citizenry at large. As illustrated in our 
historical example, when damage is done to the basic liberties it is incredibly destructive, and 
arguably damages the legitimacy  of the state when that  legitimacy  is based on a pledge to protect 
these liberties. If the only criteria for action is that the politician must subjectively  determine a 
particular course of action worthwhile for the achievement of potentially  desirable ends, then 
there is no limit on the moral dubiousness of such action and thus no meaningful moral mandate 
for the politician to respect the basic liberties of society. This could result in events such as the 
internment of American citizens during World War II in which security broadly defined was 
placed, “...far ahead of any  concern for the liberty of citizens” (Personal Justice Denied, 
Summary). That one decision made by a single man exercising an ethic of responsibility could 
override basic liberties which have been made the cornerstone of a society by the people as a 
whole is something that certainly  does not seem desirable, and flies in the face of contemporary 
Western Democracies.
 We might think to at the very least provide some safeguard to these liberties by 
demanding they be valued above all else by the vocational politician, or that politicians adopt 
them as their own convictions. For many reasons this would seem desirable. However, it  remains 
an entirely separate discussion. In order to make any normative claims regarding the importance 
of safeguarding basic liberties, or suggesting that the framework of the ethic of responsibility 
only be applied to decisions which don’t involve these liberties, we cannot avoid making some 
sort of claim about what constitutes proper action. Basically, we would always be saying that 
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proper action with regard to these liberties is action in defense of them. Although this may be 
desirable, we will remember from Part 1 Section I that it is outside the framework of Weber’s 
discussion. He seeks to make no claims regarding good action, as he assumes that the politician 
being advised is already the servant of a cause. Therefore even on what seems intuitively to be a 
very basic level, we cannot place limits on the moral dubiousness of action.
 We can at the very  least however, provide some safeguard such that especially  morally 
dubious means are not exercised in vain and thereby address the second part of the criticism 
regarding uncertainty.60  As part of the ethic of responsibility, Weber only  requires that when 
deciding to act, the politician is ready  to accept the full weight of the consequences of his action 
on his soul. Weber does not provide any guidelines for determining whether or not to act other 
than this, and the calculation to engage in morally dubious means is left entirely  up to the 
individual. Let’s consider President Roosevelt’s decision on whether or not to issue Executive 
Order 9066. By suspending the basic liberties of a certain group of citizens, he hoped to reap 
significant benefit in the form of counter-espionage and ultimately  national security. Roosevelt 
considered both national security and civil rights to be part of the same set of basic liberties, and 
therefore to have relatively  equal moral weight. Therefore if assured national security  for 
millions of Americans, he will have found it  worthwhile to suspend the civil rights of thousands. 
However we know that no great benefit  was actually provided to national security when this 
suspension actually occurred.61  Why  is this? It is because the consequences of Roosevelt’s 
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60 That is, that an ethic of responsibility does not guarantee that predicted consequences are actually achieved. Such 
uncertainty means one could sacrifice some fundamental conviction, and then not even achieve the intended good 
end making the action doubly hurtful. 
61  See the “Personal Justice Denied” report. This statement represents the general consensus of the Congressional 
Committee and of historians who write on the topic. On the highly unlikely chance however that this was not the 
case in and some benefit was reaped, it was certainly a potential outcome and still relevant to our argument from a 
purely hypothetical perspective.
actions were by no means guaranteed, and in fact meaningfully  uncertain. By  embracing risk, 
Roosevelt gambled with the civil rights of thousands of Americans. 
 Uncertainty  is the key to limiting the frequency of dangerously morally dubious action, or 
at the very  least making sure that when morally dubious action is taken it is not wasted, because 
it will almost inevitably result in the intended beneficial result. By placing the following 
restriction on the calculations of politicians practicing an ethic of responsibility, we place the 
maximum possible limit on the moral dubiousness of actions that is allowable without 
necessarily prescribing some objective moral theory: 
• The more deeply  held the moral convictions involved when calculating whether or not 
to engage in political action, the more risk-averse the politician should be in regards to 
taking action.
In other words, when the potential damage of morally  dubious actions is great, (the actions 
themselves are highly  morally dubious by the measurement of the politician’s ethical 
convictions), uncertainty as to the consequences of those actions should be taken into greater 
account. When two convictions are of the most profound value possible, (such as when one basic 
liberty prevents the realization of another), the politician must be extremely risk-averse. Any 
uncertainty as to whether the consequences of his actions will produce the desired result should 
be treated with extreme gravity, and the politician should prefer not to engage in the morally 
dubious action at all. If we demand this, we can at the very  least avoid morally  dubious action 
where the consequences of such action evade the original intention of the politician, and the 
moral sacrifice made in the action is for naught, without necessarily causing political paralysis 
and eliminating all necessary instances of dirty hands.
44
 In addition to this and on a practical note, we may also insist  on risk aversion as a guide 
to action in order to limit the effects of heuristics on political calculation. Daniel Kahneman’s 
seminal works in behavioral psychology underline the necessity for our commitment to risk 
aversion under uncertainty in matters of great moral significance. For example, in “Maps of 
Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics”,  Kahneman explores the effect of 
framing with regard to choices in game theory. Classical assumptions of rationality dictate that 
the rational human being’s preferences are unaffected by  changes in the wording of choices if 
those changes don’t alter the underlying probabilities. This is frequently  called “invariance”. The 
following instance of framing is taken directly from Kahneman’s work, and is called the “Asian 
Disease” problem. We are asked to imagine that the United States is preparing for the outbreak of 
a disease which is expected to kill 600 people and two alternative programs, (programs A and B), 
have been proposed to combat the disease. Let’s assume these programs were presented to a 
politician with the authority  to implement them. There are multiple ways of phrasing them 
without changing the actual statistical effects of the program, two of which I have taken directly 
from Kahneman’s paper and are as follows:62
Option 1 Option 2
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be 
saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third 
probability that 600 people will be saved and 
a two-thirds probability that no people will be 
saved.
If Program A is adopted, 400 people will die.
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third 
probability that nobody will die and a two 
thirds probability that 600 people will die. 
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62  Kahneman, Daniel.  "Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behavioral economics." The American 
economic review 93.5 (2003): 1449-1475.
 This is an example of framing. As we can see, the outcomes of Program A and Program B 
are not altered in the slightest, yet the wording is shifted to greater reflect either those saved or 
those lost in Options 1 & 2. Kahneman found that when presented with Option 1, a substantial 
majority  of respondents favored Program A, the more risk-averse option. However when 
presented with Option 2, the majority shifted to favor program B, the risk-seeking option. The 
Asian Disease problem highlights boundaries to rationality  that we experience as part  of human 
nature, and by doing so emphasizes limits to agency. It shows how easy it is to sway  a politician 
towards risk-seeking behavior without changing the probability  of outcomes, making it even 
more crucial that we insist on risk-aversion in the realm of politics when considering especially 
morally dubious action. If the politician is always inclined to be risk-averse, he will be less likely 
to be swayed towards risk-seeking behavior by  techniques such as framing, and this could offer 
critical protection from advisors who take advantage of the principles of heuristics to push their 
own agenda.63
VI. A Defense of the Remedy
 When we fail to find a way to make the politician more accountable for his actions in 
order to compensate for the suffering of the citizenry, our one available recourse is to limit this 
potential suffering to the greatest extent possible by placing boundaries on the actions 
themselves. In the case of Japanese interment, we find that because the consequences of his 
actions were sufficiently uncertain Franklin Roosevelt was overly risk-prone in his decision to 
authorize the creation of internment camps and the evacuation of Japanese-Americans from their 
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63  It is important to note that I am not advocating A over B in the scenario of the Asian disease, as we are unsure 
what convictions are at stake for the politician involved in the decision. The purpose of this argument is only to 
show that the politician must constantly remind himself where his values lie, and approach the most deeply held 
values with the proper attention to uncertainty, attention that should be immune to framing as much as is possible if 
he is always aware that he must be increasingly risk-averse as the values become more important.
homes. The result was an egregious breach in trust between the state and citizens, and the 
disastrous elimination of civil rights without any tangible benefits to speak of. If we insist  that 
the politician be risk-averse with regard to calculations made under an ethic of responsibility, we 
might prevent such miscalculations from affecting thousands of innocent citizens. 
 It may be tempting to critique this remedy as weak. For example, if one recognizes the 
basic liberties of society as significant, what does this remedy  do to inhibit Weber’s “ideal 
politician” from violating them under an ethic of responsibility? What if there existed a politician 
whose ultimate cause was to abolish freedom of religion in the United States because he 
maintained a deeply held conviction that Greek mythology  and only Greek mythology contained 
the keys to ethical truth? Such a politician might value freedom of religion, but ultimately 
worries that the existence of this freedom is preventing his fellow man from living spiritually 
fulfilling lives and ultimately considers the good life more desirable than freedom in this sphere. 
Even if he was risk averse, this politician could take action to abolish freedom of religion under 
the umbrella of the ethic of responsibility and be fully justified in doing so. How could any 
theory  of “ideal political action” possibly allow for this? Should this politician be stripped of his 
agency when it comes to modifying liberties set  by the Constitution, (or God, the state of nature, 
the veil of ignorance, whichever justifying mechanism you prefer)? Isn’t  there something about 
these liberties that exempts them from the subjectively held convictions of the individual?
 This criticism fails to engage Weber within the framework of his discussion. In order for 
us to value some set of shared convictions above those held internally by  the politician, we 
cannot avoid prescribing some theory regarding the moral good. Even if we were to say, “any 
liberty agreed upon by the majority of individuals is more valuable than the convictions of a 
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politician if those convictions are contrary  to it,” we would still be making a moral claim about 
how liberties are imbued with value and forcing the politician to act on the convictions of others, 
at which point he looses his cause. 
 In sum, in order to protect society as a whole from the potentially  catastrophic 
consequences resulting from an ethical miscalculation on the part of one politician, we must 
demand politicians be risk-averse in a manner proportional to the depth of their convictions. 
Short of providing some comprehensive theory of justice, this is our only  possible recourse in 
addressing the criticism that an ethic of responsibility fails to safeguard against the exercise of an 
extremely morally dubious action without a guarantee of intended benefit. It is a meaningful 
addition to the theory of ideal action being guided by an ethic of responsibility; not because it 
undermines the ethic in any way but instead because it supplements the ethic with the effect of 
limiting the real-life realization of its potential shortcomings. 
Conclusion
 Weber’s ethic of responsibility  is a deeply  compelling ethical maxim for the vocational 
politician. It is distinctly human, recognizing that when faced with the reality of moral dilemma 
and the need for dirty hands we must confront it head on and with as much moral seriousness as 
we can. The ethic of responsibility is the key  to this. It does not pretend to offer some objective 
moral truth regarding justice or the ultimate good, instead it  recognizes the tragic nature of 
political action and allows us to measure up to it inwardly  by assuming responsibility for the 
consequences of our actions. However we cannot ignore that disastrous outcomes can occur 
when the ideal politician practicing an ethic of responsibility  miscalculates. Without submitting 
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some account of objective morality we can never fully prevent such outcomes, or limit  the moral 
dubiousness of means. What we can do is ensure that to the greatest extent possible, when the 
politician makes the decision to engage in morally dubious means to achieve some end, that that 
end is at the very least ultimately achieved. By commanding the politician to be risk-averse 
proportional to the moral weight of his convictions, we mitigate the risk of miscalculation and 
ensure that the intended benefit comes from morally dubious means as often as is possible. The 
more disastrous the potential results of action, (as measured by  his own internal convictions), the 
less likely the politician will gamble on whether or not taking said actions will result in his 
intended goal. This addendum to the ethic of responsibility seems small, but the effect  is not  to 
be understated. Had President  Roosevelt exercised such restraint, thousands of Americans might 
have been spared the pain of sacrificing their deeply held civil rights for no discernible benefit to 
national security. Just  as the ethic of responsibility recognizes our limits to resolve moral 
dilemmas, so does a policy  of risk-aversion recognize the gravity of our inability  to predict 
consequences with meaningful certainty for every political act. In the spirit of the ethic of 
responsibility, we act in the best way we know how and by doing so can say  with great 
conviction, “Here I stand, I can go no further.” 
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